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Abstract 
In this paper we study a housing market with fixed supplies and demands 
that have been derived on the basis of discrete choice models. We assume 
that prices are fixed by the government for policy reasons and that there 
is excess demand. The population is initially distributed in some 
exogenously given way over the housing stock and has to be redistributed in 
accord with its own desires. This can be done by rationing and we are 
concerned with the question whether there exists some efficiënt way of 
rationing, i.e. one in which no possibilities for voluntary movements are 
left. It turns out that this is the case under general circumstances. 
However, the efficiënt equilibrium does not necessarily satisfy elementary 
equity considerations, such as equal opportunities for households in a 
comparable situation. 
The paper is concluded with an empirical investigation into the 
efficiency of the Dutch housing market. 
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1 Introduction 
The housing market has been subject to severe government measures all 
over the world. Rent control has been enforced in some cities in the United 
States (with New York as the best known example), in all western European 
countries, in centrally planned economies and in many developing countries. 
Usually the purpose of rent control has been to provide some protection for 
the harsh forces of the market to people with low incomes. Economists have 
in general not been able to find many positive effects of the measures as 
the income redistribution effects of rent control in New York seem to have 
been negligible (see Gyourko and Linnneman [1989], Linnneman [1987]), Dutch 
rent control seems to have had severe negative consequences (Oosterhaven 
and Klunder [1988]), while in centrally planned economies black markets are 
flourishing (Alexeev [1988]). As an exception, Anas and Cho [1988] tend 
towards a positive overall evaluation of the Swedish system, but their 
conclusion - that the regulation of the Swedish housing market results in a 
Pareto improvement - is based on preliminary results only. 
An immediate consequence of fixing the price of housing below the market 
level is excess-demand. Although this can in principle be avoided by 
subsidized building of new houses, in practice a situation of permanent 
discrepancies between demand and supply seems to have been the inevitable 
consequence of rent-control. Supplementary measures that distribute the 
vacant dwellings over the people who are willing to move are therefore 
necessary. The market becomes rationed. 
In this paper we will study fixed price equilibria on the housing market. 
Such equilibria consist of rationing measures which ensure that effective 
(or rationed) demand does not exceed supply. We will be particularly 
interested in the possibilities to ration the market in an efficiënt way, 
in the sense that we will avoid all unnnecessary restrictions and allow for 
all exchanges of dwellings that are mutually béneficial at the prevailing 
fixed prices. In this way we can reach Pareto-optimality. The f act that 
this kind of optimality is not (more or less) automatically ensured has to 
do with one special characteristic of the housing market : most of the 
dwellings are already occupied and the actions on the market are for a 
large part concerned with a redistribution of the given stock. 
In the next section we will give a short review of some relevant 
literature. We then present our model (section 3), derive some preliminary 
results (section 4) and move on to the central propositions of the paper 
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(section 5). Possible extensions are discussed (section 6) and flnally some 
conclusions will be formulated (section 7). 
2 Review of some relevant literature 
Since the mid-seventies there has been a great deal of interest in 
general equilibrium economics in so-called fixed price equilibria. (See 
e.g. Dreze [1974] and Benassy [1975] for some pioneering papers). The main 
motivation for this research has been the presumption that such equilibria 
could provide a micro-economie underpinning for Keynesian macro-economics 
(Malinvaud [1977]). Consequently, in this literature not much attention has 
been given to the study of such equilibria for specific markets for 
heterogeneous goods, such as the housing market, although it provides an 
important background to such research. Wiesmeth [1985] seems to be the ohly 
paper concerned with the housing market which is explicitly related to this 
literature, while Stahl and Alexeev [1985] develop a general equilibrium 
model for an economy with fixed prices and black markets which also seems 
to be relevant for further study of the housing market. 
The econometrics of disequilibrium which have been developed in relation 
with the theoretical developments (see e.g. Maddala [1982]) mentioned above 
have been used for analysis of the housing market by Anas and Eum [1986]. 
Another important development at the general level is the interest in 
non-price control that arose in the same period and was pioneered by Kornai 
and his associates (see e.g. Kornai [1980], Kornai and Martos [1981]). The 
first theoretical studies of a housing market that is not equilibrated by 
prices seem to have been inspired mainly by this research (see Kornai and 
Weibull [1978], Snickars[1978] and Weibull [1983]) and were concerned with 
the derivation of a 'normal state' of the market. They referred more or 
less explicitly to the Swedish housing market, which is heavily regulated. 
A third development that has to be mentioned here is the recent interest 
in the existence and uniqueness of price equilibria in markets where 
aggregate demand is determined on the basis of discrete choice models for 
individual decision-makers, usually called stochastic price equilibria (see 
Anas [1982], Eriksson [1986], Anas and Cho [1986], Smith [1988], Rouwendal 
[1990a]). Although the results that have been reaehed in this literatrure 
3 
are of a general nature, a main motivation for their derivation seems to 
have been their potential relevance for the study of the housing market. 
However, the housing market is very of ten a regulated market and is is 
therefore of interest to look whether the same framework can be used to 
study markets which are not equilibrated by prices. This has indeed been 
done by Anas and Cho [1988] who try to develop an operational framework for 
the study of the heavily regulated Swedish housing market and by Rouwendal 
[1990b] where some existence theorems fór rationed equilibria are proved. 
The present paper is concerned with the existence of rationed equilibria 
that satisfy certain desirable properties. In particular, attention will be 
given to equilibria that are efficiënt in the sense that at the rationed 
equilibrium no mutually beneficial trades can be carried out at the 
prevailing prices. Optimality properties of rationing schemes were 
considered by Dreze and Mueller [1980] , who introduced the term 
'constrained Pareto optima'. The question we will be concerned with is 
whether there exist such constrained Pareto optima on the housing market, 
with its special characteristics of indivisibility and redistribution. 
It should be stressed at once that a constrained Pareto optimum is not 
optimal in all respects : it refers to efficiency, not to equity (for a 
discussion of equity properties of rationing schemes see Sah [1987]). Nor 
does it give Information about the desirability of fixing the prices (see 
Weitzman [1977]) or does it imply that there will be no reason for actors 
to engage in black market transactions. The analysis brings out clearly, 
however, that efficiency and equity considerations are not easy to 
reconcile. 
3 Description of the model 
In the model that will be employed behaviour of individual actors is the 
starting point of the analysis. This behaviour will be described by means 
of individual decision functions, which give the probability that an actor 
chooses a particular alternative. Although we do not use specific 
formulations of the individual choice functions, an almost natural 
interpretation is to view them as discrete choice models, such as the logit 
or probit model. This places the present paper in the line of research on 
stochastic equilibria. 
We consider a heterogeneous population which consists of b actors. Each 
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actor belongs to one of M groups. The groups may have been distinguished on 
the basis of income, number of persons in the household or any other 
criterion judged to be relevant. 
This population is distributed over N possible states, indexed 1 N. 
Each of the states 1,...,N can be identified with a dwelling type. Since we 
study the distribution of a given population over a given stock of 
dwellings we will refer to our model as a closed model. The closed model 
provides a convenient starting point for the present analysis. However, 
since it is far more realistic to have the possibility to deal with 
households entering or leaving the market we will also discuss an open 
model in section 6. 
It is assumed that the households are initially distributed over the 
existing housing stock in some exogeneous way. The probability that a 
household of group m (m=l,...,M) that is in state n will choose to move to 
state n' (n,n'=l, . . . ,N) will be denoted as ir ,. This probability is 
mn-m'
 c J 
assumed to be a function of the fixed prices p and of the rationing 
parameters Q, where p is an (N+l)-dimensional vector and Q a NxN-
dimensional matrix. 
These rationing parameters will be denoted as q , and should be 
interpreted as the fraction of actors who are initially in state n and who 
intend to move to state n' that will be allowed to do so. We will not be 
concerned with the question how this fraction is composed. One 
interpretation is that people that have been waiting for the longest time 
are allowed to move first; then the expected waiting time equals 1/q ,. 
Another is that the people who will be allowed to move are selected 
randomly, by giving them all the same probability q , of realizing their 
intention. 
It will be assumed that all actors who wish to continue their sojourn in 
a particular state will always be able to do so, i.e. q =1 for all f J nn->-n 
n=l,...,N. All realization fractions should have a value between 0 and 1, 
boundaries included. We will denote the set of matrices Q with elements 
q . that fulfill this criterion as Q. This set is closed and convex. 
n->n' 
In summary, we have : 
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TT , = TT , (p,Q) , (1) 
mn-m' mn-m' r 
m=l,...,M, n,n'=1,...,N. 
These choice probability functions will be assumed to be continuous in the 
realization probabilities q ,. We will make no further assumptions about 
the sign of the influence of these variables or differentiability. 
The total number of actors that are initially in state n and are willing 
* 
to move to alternative n' will be denoted as D , and is defined as : 
n-m' 
*
 M 
D , (p,Q) = 7 b .7T , (p,Q) , (2) 
m=l 
n,n'=l N. 
It should be noted that this equation gives the number of intended moves, 
which should be distinguished from the number of realized moves, which will 
now be determined. 
The total number of actors who intend to move from n to n' and are able 
to realize their intention will be denoted as D , and is defined as : 
n-m' 
M 
D , (p,Q) = X q , .?r , (P,Q) , (3) 
m=l 
n-1 N. 
The number of people in state n who were willing to move to state n', but 
were not able to realize their intention will be denoted as D and is 
n 
defined as : 
M 
D ,(P.Q) - I (1-q , ) • * ,(p,Q).b , (4) n-m' ^'x u^ Hn-^n' mn-*n'^'x mn 
m=l 
n=l,...,N. 
This definition is based on the assumption, introduced above, that actors 
will always be allowed to continue their initial situation if a desired 
move turns out to be impossible. 
The total effective demand for a state n, to be denoted as D , is defined 
n 
as the actual number of actors that will be in that state (voluntarily or 
involuntarily) at the end of the period and equals : 
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Dn(P)Q) = ï ( W P . Q ) +ÖMif(p,Q) }, (5) 
n'=0 
n-1 N. 
Finally, we have to close our model by introducing supply. We will do 
this in a particularly simple way by assuming that the capacity of all 
states n, n=l,...,N, is fixed at a value S . When the model refers to the 
n 
housing market this says that the number of dwellings of type n is fixed. 
In the next section we will start our investigation of the possibilities to 
equilibrate demand and supply. 
4 Some preliminary results 
A weak definition of a rationed equilibrium is the following : 
Definition 4.1 A rationed equilibrium is a set of realization probabilities 
* * 
{q . , n,n'=0,1,...,N}, such that for all n e {1,...,N} D (p,Q ) < S . 
n' -+n n r n 
The definition simply requires that the rationing to be such that demand 
will never exceed supply and has been termed weak because it does not 
involve any requirement on the efficiency of the rationing scheme. The 
rationing may for instance be much too strong in that the effective demand 
D is smaller than the supply S while some realization probabilities q , 
n
 J
 n ^n'-m 
are smaller than 1. In order to avoid such equilibria we will introducé a 
natural notion of efficiency, that will be termed 1-efficiency in order to 
distinguish it from others, to be introduced later on. 
Definition 4.2 A rationed equilibrium is called 1-efficient if D (p,Q ) = 
S whenever q , < 1 for some n' e {0,1,...,N} . 
n nn'-m 
In a 1-efficient equilibrium it is impossible that an actor who intends to 
move to a dwelling of type n is able to find a vacant dwelling of that 
type. 
We will now introducé a notion of equity in our rationing scheme that 
requires that all people willing to move to the same type of dwelling will 
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experience the same realization fractions, which are therefore independent 
of their initial situation. Formally we define : 
Definition 4.3 A set of realization probabilities is uniform if 
q ,=q ,, for all n.,n' e {0,1 N) . 
nn-m' nn-m' ' 
Next, we make the following formal assumption : 
Assumption 4.1 a) the choice probability functions n ,, m=l,...,M, 
r J
 mn-m' 
n,n'=0,l N, are continuous in the realization probabilities 
o n'' n'''=0 1 N 
n' ' -*n' ' ' ' u , J. , . . . , ii, 
M 
b) S > Y b , n=l,...,N. J
 n t-- mn' 
m=l 
Part a) of this assumption is simply a repetition of the continuity 
requirement mentioned in section 3 above, part b) and is needed in order to 
ensure that our earlier mentioned assumption that all actors will be able 
to continue their initial situation is valid. 
We have the following proposition : 
Proposition 4.1 If assumption 4.1 is satisfied there exists a uniformly 
rationed equilibrium. 
For the proof of this proposition we refer to Rouwendal [1990, proposition 
8]. It consists of a simple fixed point argument. 
It is remarkable that we can prove existence of a rationed equilibrium 
under such weak assumptions. This may be viewed as an affirmation of the 
intuitive notion that rationing can do the allocation job in cases where 
the price mechanism fails. 
On the other hand it should be realized that the uniformly rationed 
equilibrium lacks some desirable properties which the price system 
possesses. The most important of these is that in a price equilibrium the 
actors are in an optimal situation in the sense that they cannot improve 
their position at the prevailing prices. In the rationed equilibrium there 
will be unsatisfied demand as long as there is one realization probability 
smaller than 1. In part, this unsatisfied demand is an inevitable 
consequence of the rationing. For another part, however, it may have to do 
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with the specific form of the rationing, even when it is 1-efficient. 
To see this it suffices to observe that at the uniformly rationed 
equilibrium pairs of actors may be found that find it beneficial - at the 
prevailing fixed prices - to 'swap', that is, to exchange their dwellings. 
The uniformly rationed equilibrium can thus be inefficiënt in the sense 
that the unsatisfied demand is unnecessarily large. It is therefore natural 
to ask whether such inefficiency can be avoided. 
In order to get an answer to this question we will leave the notion of a 
uniformly rationed equilibrium and allow the realization probabilities to 
be dependent on the original state of the actors. Furthermore, we will 
introducé the notion of 2-efficiency : 
Definition 4.2 A rationed equilibrium will be called 2-efficiënt if no pair 
of actors can be found who are willing to exchange their dwellings. 
An immediate consequence of this definition is that in a 2-efficiënt 
equilibrium any pair of realization probabilities (q , , q , ) at least H J
 *
 r
 m-m' m' -m 
one element should be equal to 1. At least 50 % of all possible moves are 
allowed to take place unconstrained. Although this does not imply that at 
least 50 % of the actors will experience no constraints on their behaviour, 
it nevertheless indicates that regulati-on of the housing market does not 
automatically imply rationing of all possible moves. 
The existence of a 2-efficiënt equilibrium will now be proven without any 
further assumptions : 
Proposition 4.2 When assumption 4.1 is satisfied, there exists a 
2-efficient rationed equilibrium. 
Proof. Consider the following mapping : 
f ,(Q) - min{l, D* ,/D*, }, (6) 
n-m' n-m" n'-m 
n,n'=l,...,N. 
It is immediately clear from (6) that the functions f , are continuous in 
J
 n-m 
the variables q ,. Moreover, f , always takes on a value in the closed 
n-m n-m'
 J 
interval [0,1]. The matrix-valued function F(Q) is therefore continuous and 
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maps the closed and convex set ü of all realization probabilities into 
itself. By Brouwer's theorem it may therefore be concluded that it has a 
* 
fixed point Q . This fixed point corresponds with an equilibrium since 
q ,.D < q , .D , for all n,n'=l,...,N. D 
n-m' n-m' n'-m n -m 
It would of course be desirable that the 2-efficient equilibrium is also 
1-efficiënt. However, this will in general not necessarily be the case. To 
see this it should be observed that the notion of 2-efficiency is concerned 
with exchanges of dwellings only. If there are initially vacant dwellings, 
there can be a 2-efficient rationed equilibrium in which these vacant 
dwellings are not filled. Indeed, the fixed point that has been proven to 
exist refers to such a 1-inefficient equilibrium. 
One may also wonder whether a 2-efficient equilibrium is uniform. 
Although the notions of 2-efficiency and uniformity do not exclude each 
other, they surely do not imply each other. There is no reason why at any 
given realization fractions the ratio's D , /D , and D ,, /D 
° n-m n-m' n '-m n-m 
should be equal to each other. It must therefore be concluded that an 
equilibrium that is both 2-efficient and uniform will only occur by 
accident. 
It is natural to ask whether there can also be 3 or higher efficiënt 
equilibria. The answer is affirmative. This will be shown in the next 
section, where we will prove our main results. 
5 Efficiënt rationed equilibria 
In the present section we will prove the existence of a rationed 
equilibrium that is simultaneously 1,2 N-efficient. For brevity, such 
an equilibrium will be called efficiënt. At such an equilibrium there are 
no additional transactions left which would be beneficial to all the actors 
involved. The efficiënt equilibrium can therefore be identified with a 
Pareto optimum. 
It will be convenient to have a special term for equilibria that are 
2,3 N-efficient, but not necessarily 1-efficient. Since the notion of 
2,3 N-efficiency refers to exchanges of dwellings, in contrast to that 
of 1-efficiency, we will call such equilibria exchange efficiënt. 
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Before we prove our main propositions we first have to introducé some 
additional terminology. A loop will be defined as an ordered set of 
different states n, n=l,...,N which has at least 2 elements. A loop 
{n.. ,n„, . . ,n.} should be identified with a closed sequence of connections 
n^ n--»-. . .-m.-m.. . It will be clear from this description that two loops in 
which the same elements appear in the same order, but with different 
starting elements are in fact identical. E.g. the loops {1,2,3}, {2,3,1} 
and {3,1,2} refer to the same closed sequence of connections. We will refer 
to an arbitrary loop by means of the symbol A and denote the set of all 
loops as A. The maximum number of elements in a loop is clearly N. 
It will be convenient to have an ordering of the elements of A. For this 
purpose we will use the convention that the smallest element of a loop will 
be put in the front position. A loop with a larger number of elements will 
be given a higher order. For loops with the same number of elements the one 
with the largest element in the front position will get the higher order. 
When both the number of elements and the element in the front position are 
equal the values of the elements in the second position are decisive, etc. 
The resulting ordering is : {1,2}, {1,3}, ... {1,N}, {2,3}, {2,4}, ... 
{N-l.N}, {1,2,3}, {1,2,4} {1,2,...,N}. 
In the previous section it has been shown that a 2-efficiënt rationed 
equilibrium can be identified with an equilibrium in which for all loops of 
length 2 at least one of the realization probabilities q and q 
nrn2 v n i 
equals 1. In the same way a K-efficient rationed equilibrium can be 
identified with a rationed equilibrium in which for each chain of length K 
at least one of the choice probabiliites q , i=l i, with n. -,=n.,, 
r
 Ti.-m. ' 2+1 1 
1 1+1 
equals 1. 
We are now in a position to prove our first main result : 
Proposition 5.1 When assumption 4.1 is satisfied there exists an exchange 
efficiënt equilibrium. 
Proof. We will make use of a fixed-point argument. For this purpose we will 
construct a mapping of the set ü of all realization probabilities into 
itself. The construction of this mapping will be motivated by means of a 
distribution mechanism. 
Consider a situation in which prices are fixed and realization fractions 
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are somehow determined. Since the realization fractions are given, the 
* 
values of the variables D , can be determined. Now take the first loop of 
n-m 
* 
the set A, ordered in the way defined above, {1,2}, and diminish both D.. . 
and D
 1 with min {D.. „, D„ 1 } . Then move on to the second chain, follow 
the same procedure etc. 
In general, when we arrive at the k-th loop we will determine the minimum 
of what is left of the demands D , i=l, . . . , 2, and subtract this. In 
n.-m. ' i ï+l 
this way we ensure that all exchange possibilities that exist will be used. 
The value of D , that remains after all this procedure will de denoted 
n-m' 
as D , . It will be clear that 0 < D , < D , . Moreover, D , is a 
n-m n-m n-m' n-m 
continuous function of the q 's since every step in the determination of 
n-m 
D , is continuous. 
n-m 
Now define the following mapping : 
f , (Q) = 1 - D ,/D ,, (7) 
n-m' n-m n-m' 
n,n'=0,l,...,N. 
The matrix-valued function F maps the closed, convex set Q into itself and 
is continuous. We can therefore conclude, by Brouwer's theorem, that it has 
a fixed point. This point corresponds with an exchange efficiënt 
equilibrium since, by construction of the mapping, there are no additional 
exchange possibilities left. D 
An immediate consequence of this proposition is that an efficiënt 
equilibrium exists in markets where supply exactly meets demand : 
M 
Eb = S (8) 
, mn n 
m=l 
n-1 N. 
This special case is known as a balanced market and is repeatedly studied 
in the literature on stochastic price equilibria (see e.g. Eriksson [1986], 
Smith [1988]). This will be stated formally as : 
Corrollary 5.1 In a balanced market there exists an efficiënt equilibrium. 
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In the general case, in which equation (8) is not valid for all n, we 
still have to prove existence of 1-efficiency in combination with exchange 
efficiency. 
Proposition 5.2 When assumption 4.1 is satisfied there exists an efficiënt 
equilibrium. 
Proof. As in the proof of proposition 5.1 we will construct a mapping of Q 
into itself. Assume that realization fractions have been determined 
somehow. Start with the procedure that has been used for the proof of 
proposition 5.1. and determine the values of the variables D .. The 
n-m' 
number of vacant dwellings of type n will be denoted as V . 
Now consider the set of all ordered pairs {n.. , n„} , n./n. and order it as 
follows : {1,2},{1,3},...,U.N),{2,1},{2,3}, ,{N,N-1}. Start with the 
first pair, {1,2}, and subtract min {D
 0,V_} from D „ and add the same 
value to V„. Move on to the second pair, etc. Then start again with the the 
pair {1,2} and repeat the procedure. Continue until either the number of 
actors intending to move to a state n or the number of vacancies of that 
state equals zero, for all n=l,..,N. Since the volume of the unsatisfied 
demand decreases during the procedure we can be sure that it will converge. 
The ultimate level of the unsatisfied demand will be denoted as D ,. This 
n-m' 
variable is continuous in the realization fractions q ,. 
m-m 
The mapping we use is analogous to the one defined above : 
f , - 1 - D ,/D (9) 
n-m' n-m" n-m' 
n,n'=l N. 
The existence of a fixed point is guaranteed in the usual way. This fixed 
point corresponds with an efficiënt equilibrium. D 
6 Discussion 
In the present section we will discuss the contents of the propositions 
proved above and reflect on their implications for rationing policy. 
We will start with an examination of the question whether the model can 
be extended to include the appearance of new households (by household 
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formation or immigration) and the departure of others (because of death or 
emigration). We can give an unconditional affirmative answer to this 
question. We will introducé a new state, 0 into the model. Actors who leave 
the market (for whatever reason) will be dealt with as moving to state 0, 
actors who enter the market as coming from state 0. There will of course be 
no capacity restriction for this state, but one might nevertheless 
introducé realization fraction q _, reflecting e.g. limited emigration 
possibilities, if one wishes to do so. The number of actors of class m who 
are originally in state 0 will be denoted as b and is assumed to be 
given. This extended model will be referred to as the open model. 
The existence of an efficiënt equilibrium in the open model can be proven 
in the same way as was done for the closed model. Bef ore one starts the 
procedure lined out in the proof of proposition 5.2 one can start with 
letting al those willing to move to state 0 and able to do so move out. 
After the procedure lined out in the proof of proposition 5.2 has been 
stopped, actors who are in state 0 can be allowed to move in the dwellings 
that still remain vacant. This implies that we have : 
Proposition 6.1 When assumption 4.1 is satisfied there exists an efficiënt 
equilibrium in the open model. 
We will give no detailed proof for this proposition, but the discussion 
that precedes its statement will suffice to give a clear idea how it can be 
obtained. 
If one wishes to do so one can of course distinguish various substates in 
state 0. E.g. actors willing to enter the market may be distinguished in 
newly formed households in the geographical area to which the model refers 
and potential immigrants. Actors leaving the market may be distinguished in 
emigrants and deceased. The structure of the model remains essentially 
unchanged. 
A second aspect of the model that needs some discussion are the equity 
properties of the mechanism that is used. It will be clear from section 4 
that uniform rationing will in general not be efficiënt. Efficiency 
requires that the realization fractions can be differentiated on the basis 
of the Initial situation of the actors. This implies that of two actors 
willing to move to the same type of dweiling one may have a much greater 
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probability of realizing his desire than the other, simply because he 
occupies a different type of dwelling. 
Another equity aspect refers to the order in which the various existing 
loops are checked for the existence of mutually beneficial trades. 
Realisation of the trades associated with one loop may diminish, or even 
reduce to zero, trades associated with other loops, which are checked later 
on. 
The problem becomes even more complex when we consider the open model. 
The procedure that has been outlined just before the statement of 
proposition 6.1 is highly beneficial to actors who are already 
participating in the market. Those entering the model will only be able to 
occupy dwellings that were not desired by anyone already participating in 
the market. 
It is of course possible to change the procedure. The loops can be 
ordered in an arbitrarily chosen different way. Participants willing to 
enter the model can be dealt with alternatively by act ing initially as if 
state 0 is a state like all others. Af ter exchange efficiency has been 
reached, those willing to move to state 0 but thus f ar not able to do so 
will be moved out and the same procedure that was used in the proof of 
proposition 5.2 can be used to allocate the remaining vacant dwellings. In 
this way actors entering the model will in all probability have a better 
chance of obtaining a dwelling. 
The choice for a particular rationing mechanism has therefore important 
implications for the equity of the resulting allocation, although it is not 
clear a priori which of the possible mechanisms that lead to an efficiënt 
equilibrium gives rise to the 'fairest' distribution of the housing stock 
over the population. 
It will be clear from the preceding discussion that an efficiënt 
equilibrium will in general not be unique. Different allocation procedures 
will in general give rise to different equilibria which are all efficiënt. 
It might even be the case that the same allocation procedure does not 
correspond with a unique equilibrium. 
The model presented here refers to the short run only. It is difficult to 
say what will happen in the long run. If unsatisfied demand will manifest 
itself in the same way in the next periods it may be expected that the 
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disequilibria concentrate at some bottlenecks in the market. It may happen 
that other parts of the market remain relatively unaffected, but it seems 
more likely that the excess demands spread and the market becomes 'stopped 
up'. Ultimately a number of demanders will reconcile theirselves to their 
present situation, choose a second-best option or change their preferences, 
e.g. by reaching a different stage in their life cycle. 
It will also be clear from the foregoing that most of the rationing 
schemes which are actually in use on regulated housing markets do not give 
priority to efficiency, but are more concerned with equity. E.g. the 
procedures that are used on the Dutch housing market - although far from 
transparant - give a priority treatment to special kinds of actors (i.e. 
differentiate on the basis of household characteristics) and use the 'first 
come, first served' rule. There seems to be no differentiation on the basis 
of the dweiling that will be left by a searching household. It may be 
expected therefore that the Dutch system of allocating vacant dwellings 
will not give rise to efficiënt outcomes. (This will be considered in more 
detail in the next section.) As the systems that are in use in other 
countries do seem to have the same characteristics, the same conjecture is 
also relevant there. 
7 The Dutch Housing Market 
The Dutch housing market consists of a heavily regulated part, containing 
rented dwellings, and a relatively f ree part, mainly consisting of owner-
occupied dwellings. Ever since the Second World War prices have been 
determined by the government on the rented part of the market. For this 
empirical illustration we will therefore concentrate on the rationing that 
takes place in the housing market of the Dutch capital, Amsterdam. The data 
have been derived from the Housing Needs Survey (WoningBehoefte Onderzoek) 
of 1981 and concern the households that intended to move from a rented 
dwelling to another rented dweiling within the Amsterdam area. We 
classified the dwellings on the basis of three criteria : single-family-
dwelling or apartment, number of rooms and rent. Details are given in table 
1. 
Also in table 1 we listed the origins and destinations of the people 
intending to move to another rented dwelling within the Amsterdam area. It 
is clear from this table that the large majority of these people live in 
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Table 1 Intended moves 
desired moves 
number of number of number of number of 
Nr. ap./s.f.d. rooms rent dwellings oripins destinations 
i-i s.f.d 1,2,3 < 250 80 5 10 
2 s.f.d. 1,2,3 250-450 30 1 31 
3 s.f.d. 1,2,3 > 450 5 1 5 
4 s.f.d. 4 < 250 15 8 2 
5 s.f.d. 4 250-450 20 4 23 
6 s.f.d. 4 > 450 12 2 13 
7 s.f.d. > 5 < 450 143 1 62 
8 s.f.d. > 5 > 450 25 1 20 
single family dwellings 330 23 166 
9 ap. 
10 ap. 
11 ap. 
12 ap. 
13 ap. 
14 ap. 
15 ap. 
16 ap. 
apartments 
1,2 < 250 504 99 27 
1,2 > 250 246 34 22 
3 < 250 742 122 40 
3 250-450 328 26 68 
3 > 450 112 17 16 
> 4 < 250 418 70 24 
> 4 250-450 555 40 69 
> 4 > 450 334 35 34 
3239 443 300 
total 466 466 
apartments and that many of them want to move to a single family dweiling. 
Supply and demand of the dwellings are therefore not in equilibrium. It is 
immediately clear from the table that of the 166 people intending to move 
to a single family dweiling, at most 23 can be served if we confine 
ourselves to moves within the existing stock of dwellings. At least 143 
households will not be able to move, which implies that the average 
realization probability equals at most 0.69. Because of the heterogeneity 
within the groups of single-family-dwellings and apartments one may expect 
that the actual realization probabilities will even be lower. 
It is clear from the figures in table 1 that there are large differences 
in the willingness to move between occupiers of the various housing types. 
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Table 2 Realized moves 
within the to newly 
existing constructed starters migrants 
stock dwellings 
Nr. or. dest. or. dest. new ex. new ex. 
1 3.50 2.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.50 0.00 0.25 
2 1.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.00 0.00 
3 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 
4 0.00 0.75 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 
5 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 1.00 0.25 
6 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
7 2.75 0.50 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 
8 0.75 0.25 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 
sfd 8.75 4.50 1.75 0.25 0.50 2.75 1.00 1.75 
9 24.00 19.75 0.50 2.50 0.50 47.75 0.00 8.25 
10 26.00 9.25 5.75 1.00 2.50 23.75 0.50 9.00 
11 8.75 18.00 0.25 3.25 0.00 3.75 0.00 1.25 
12 14.25 8.00 2.25 1.25 0.50 2.50 0.25 1.75 
13 7.25 4.50 1.50 1.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
14 1.50 11.75 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
15 3.50 9.25 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.50 0.00 0.25 
16 2.25 11.25 1.00 2.00 2.50 6.50 0.75 2.25 
ap. 87.50 91.75 11.50 13.00 6.25 85.75 1.50 23.75 
to. 96.25 96.25 13.25 13.25 6.75 88.50 2.50 25.50 
When we restrict our attention to apartments (the small numbers of single 
family dwellings make it difficult to draw conclusions for this segment of 
the market) we get the strong impression that people in houses with a 
medium rent (between 250 and 450 guilders per month) are, in general, less 
willing to move than those in cheaper or more expensive houses. Also, it 
seems that houses with a medium rent are more in favour as an intended 
destination than those with a high or low rent. This makes the impression 
of significant disequilibria even stronger and enforces the conjecture 
mentioned above. 
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In the first two columns of table 2 the average yearly numbers of 
realized moves have been listed. If we make the assumption that the 
situation on the rented part of the housing market changes little over 
time, these figures can be regarded as an indication of the number of moves 
that will be realized. The ratio of this indicator and the number of 
intended moves gives an impression of the actual realization probabilities. 
Again disregarding the single-family-dwelling segment of the market, it can 
be verified that these realization probabilities show large differences and 
vary between 75 % for dwellings of type 10 and 2% for dwellings of type 14. 
The realization probabilities show a clear tendency to decrease with 
dwelling size (given the rent class) and are lowest for the low-rented 
dwellings (for all sizes of dwellings). This gives the impression that the 
rationing on the Amsterdam housing market is not uniform. (A thorough 
investigation of this conjecture would require a much more detailed 
analysis, however.) The average realization probability equals 0.21. If we 
also take into account the moves from the existing stock to newly 
constructed dwellings (see columns 3 and 4 of table 2) , the average 
realization probability rises to 0.23. 
In order to get some Idea whether the actual rationing procedure on the 
Amsterdam housing market is efficiënt, the numbers of realizable moves 
within the existing housing stock have been computed with the aid of the 
procedure outlined in the preceding sections. It turned out that an 
efficiënt equilibrium was already reached when loops consisting of two 
elements were considered (i.e. no loops with a higher number of elements 
were possible after these small loops were conisdered). The results are 
shown in table 3. 
It appears from that table that the number of realizable moves is larger 
than the average number of realized moves. The average realization 
probability equals 0.34. It should be stressed that this value has been 
reached by considering only (extended) exchanges of dwellings within the 
existing stock. Some of the actual moves have occured because of the 
appearance of vacant dwellings because of migration, moves to special 
housing for the elderly, etc. Such moves have not been taken into account 
by our method. 
In order to get an impression of the number of additional moves that 
would be made possible by vacancies that occur within the existing stock, 
we used the following procedure. We can compute the number of moves that 
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Table 3 Realizable Moves 
nr. moves vacancies nr. moves vacancies 
1 3 0.75 9 25 41.25 
2 1 -0.50 10 17 9.25 
3 1 0.25 11 32 14.00 
4 2 1.00 12 15 -4.00 
5 2 -0.25 13 8 -4.25 
6 2 0.00 14 20 12.25 
7 1 -1.50 15 15 6.25 
8 1 
13 
-1.25 16 
apartments 
15 
147 
16.75 
s.f.d. -1.50 91.50 
had an existing (i.e. non-newly-constructed) dwelling as their destination 
by adding up the number of destinations of moves within the existing stock, 
the number of starters and migrants that moved into such a dwelling. When 
one subtracts from this total the numbers of origins of the moves within 
the existing dwelling stock, one gets an estimate of the number of 
dwellings within the existing stock that become vacant. These numbers are 
also listed in table 3. From these figures one gets the impression that a 
substantial number of additional moves would be possible if these vacancies 
were also taken into account. However, it turns out that a large number of 
the vacancies occur for dwelling types which are not desired by many 
households as a destination of their moves. If : a) we regard a negative 
number as an indication of a diminishing stock of the relevant dwelling 
type and b) take the minimum of the number of estintated vacancies and the 
number of desired destinations of households that have not yet moved as an 
indication of the number of additional moves, we arrive at a total number 
of additional possible moves of 31.25. This would increase the average 
realization probability to 0.41, and even to 0.43 if also moves to newly 
constructed dwellings are taken into account. This is significantly higher 
than the actual figure. 
Should one conclude from the figures presented above that the actual 
rationing system of the Amsterdam area is inefficiënt ? One is tempted to 
give a positive answer. An efficiënt rationing procedure may be too much 
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to expect from a local authority if the loops that are involved are large. 
In the computation of the realizable moves presented in figure 2, however, 
there occured no moves containing more than two elements. The computation 
of the additional moves, made possible by the occurence of vacancies, may 
be characterized as conservative, since it does not consider the 
possibility of additional moves within the existing stock which become 
possible as a result of moves towards these vacancies. It may be added that 
we have not considered the possibility of second-best choices which occur 
when households give up some of their desires. This phenomeneon may be 
expected to be of some importance in a heavily rationed housing market. 
However, it should also be realized that the information about the 
desired dweiling type refers to three aspects only (sfd/apartment, number 
of rooms and rent), while in reality there may be number of other 
characteristics which are relevant, such as the location within the 
municipality. So our evidence is not completely conclusive. 
8 Conclusion 
In this paper it has been shown that in a rationed housing market there 
may exist unnecessary inefficiencies which can be removed by examination of 
the possibilities for mutual exchange. The almost inevitable result is that 
realization probabilities will vary with the original situation of the 
household and that the possibilities to make these probabilties dependent 
on other criteria diminishes. Equity and efficiency - again - turn out to 
be hard to reconcile. The paper is concluded with an empirical 
investigation into the Amsterdam housing market. The results indicate that 
the prevailing rationing mechanism on that housing market does not lead to 
efficiënt outcomes. 
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